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This article explores the variations in the wage distribution in
two Latin American countries, Bolivia and Colombia, which have
had different economic policies in recent years. Using data from
household surveys, a decomposition of the wage distribution in
each country using Functional Principal Component Analysis
is conducted. The results suggest that Bolivia, which has taken
left-wing economic policies, has experienced a general increase
in wages, especially benefiting the least skilled workers and the
informal sector. On the other hand, the wage distribution in
Colombia, whose economic policy has been focused on free-market
principles, has become more concentrated around the median
wage, mainly due to changes in the formal sector wages.
JEL: J31; J38; C14
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Wages are an indicator of the state of the economy and the well-being of the
workforce. As economies develop, the structure of the labor market also changes,
thereby affecting the wage distribution structure. This paper aims to explore
what are the differences in the evolution of the wage distribution in different po-
litical contexts by comparing two developing Latin American countries, Bolivia
and Colombia, that have taken different political paths. Since 2006, when Evo
Morales became president of Bolivia, the country has shifted toward left-wing
policies such as an expansion of the public sector and increased levels of social
assistance (Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila, 2015). In contrast, during the
same time frame, Colombia has taken policies directed to foster economic growth
through free-market principles and the improvement of national security (Aris-
tiza´bal-Ramı´rez et al., 2015).
In spite of the differences in economic policies, Bolivia and Colombia have
many similarities. Both countries had a period of fast economic growth in the
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late 2000s and early 2010s, mainly driven by the commodites boom of that period.
However, both economies are still among the most unequal in the world (World
Bank, 2017) and although there have been reductions in the poverty rate in both
countries, more than 25% of the population of both Bolivia and Colombia live
in poverty (ECLAC, 2016). In addition, the average educational attainment for
the population aged 25 or older in Bolivia is 7.8 years, whereas in Colombia
it is 8.4 years. In both cases, the educational attainment is below the mean for
advanced economies (11 years) (Barro and Lee, 2013). Furthermore, about half of
the labor force works in the informal sector (INE, 2017; DANE, 2017). Behrman
(1999) notes that low education levels of the workforce and high prevalence of
informality are characteristic of labor markets in developing countries. These
similarities imply that the effects of the policies on the evolution of wages are
more evident, since other possible causes of wage variation like economic growth
or labor market composition do not differ by much.
To analyze the evolution of the wage distribution in both countries, I em-
ploy a decomposition technique using Functional Principal Component Analysis
(FPCA). This method, first developed by Kneip and Utikal (2001) and further
extended by Huynh et al. (2011), allows to decompose a family of probability den-
sity functions into its mean and a time-specific deviation from the mean. From
the FPCA decomposition I obtain a profile of the changes of the wage distribution
over time in each country. This allows to compare the dynamics of the distribu-
tions and identify the key differences between them. Previous applications of
FPCA decomposition in the context of firm size distribution in the United King-
dom, Canada and Ukraine are found in Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez (2010), Huynh
et al. (2015) and Huynh et al. (2016) respectively. Chu et al. (2016) use this
method to analyze the dynamics of consumer price distributions in the United
Kingdom.
This decomposition has a series of interesting characteristics. Since it is a
non-parametric method, there is no a priori restriction about the shape of the
probability density function. Besides, it describes the whole wage distribution,
instead of focusing only on the mean wage or certain quantiles. The extension
of FPCA proposed by Huynh et al. (2011) to include discrete covariates allows
to capture the differences in evolution over time between subsets of the sample,
thus providing more information about the changes observed in unconditional
probability densities.
The contribution of this article to the literature of wage dynamics is twofold.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to use FPCA decomposition to
study the dynamics of wage distributions, thus presenting a novel methodology
to study changes in wage distributions over time. Furthermore, I analyze the
labor markets in two Latin American economies. By doing so, this article adds
to the existing literature on wage distribution and wage dynamics in the region
and in developing countries in general (e.g. Atal et al., 2009; Carrillo et al., 2014;
Ferna´ndez and Messina, 2017).
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After applying this technique to data obtained from household surveys in both
countries, I found that Bolivia achieved a rather uniform increase in wages during
Evo Morales’ presidency, especially benefiting workers with less education and
those in the informal sector. On the other hand, between 2008 and 2015 in
Colombia, the wage distribution became more concentrated around the median
wage. Such change was mostly attributed to changes in the formal sector of the
economy. In relation to Bolivia, wage variation in Colombia was distributed more
evenly between males and females and between the least and the most educated
workers.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents some existing litera-
ture on wage dynamics and wage determination, while Section III provides some
background about labor markets in Bolivia and Colombia. The data are pre-
sented along with descriptive statistics for both countries in Section IV. Section
V describes the Functional Principal Component Analysis method and its imple-
mentation to wage distributions. Results are presented and discussed in Section
VI, and Section VII concludes.
II. Review of wage dynamics literature
The literature on wage determinants and wage inequality is very large and
the topic has been approached in many different ways. It is generally accepted
that individual characteristics like levels of education or work experience imply
different wages as they affect labor productivity. However, this is not the only
reason behind wage inequality. Labor markets are not perfectly competitive,
leading to market failures like considerable market power for certain firms and
workers. In addition to these failures, discrimination based on seemingly irrelevant
factors such as race or gender also plays an important role in creating wage gaps.
Labor market institutions like unions and minimum wages add yet another source
of inequality (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). This variety
of causes explains the interest towards this phenomenon and the wide array of
focuses and methods used.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, wage inequality increased in many countries
around the world (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Melly, 2005; Weiss and Garloff, 2011).
One of the most cited causes of such growth is the technological change that
especially favored skilled workers by making them more productive in relation to
their unskilled counterparts. Indeed, this change has been named by some authors
Skill Based Technological Change (SBTC). Juhn et al. (1993) explore the changes
in education and experience in the United States as causes of the rising inequality
between 1963 and 1989 and find that real wages for the most skilled workers
increased by 40 percent, while the most unskilled workers received real wages
5 percent lower in 1989 than in 1963. They find observable and unobservable
characteristics to be highly correlated with the spike in inequality, as demand for
skilled workers rose faster. These findings are confirmed by Autor et al. (2006),
who decomposed wage inequality in the United States between 1973 and 2004
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into inequality between the 90th and 50th percentile and inequality between the
50th and 10th percentile. While the 90/50 gap increased during the whole period,
the 50/10 gap stabilized after 1987, thus increasing overall inequality, or as the
authors describe it, polarizing the labor market even further between skilled and
unskilled workers, who have become more prone to be replaced by computers or
other machines, further reducing relative demand for unskilled labor.
While SBTC constitutes an important part of the explanation behind wage
inequality, the institutional factor cannot be overlooked. Minimum wages, union-
ization, labor market regulations and other institutions play an important role in
wage determination and equality. For instance, Blau and Kahn (1996) observe
that male wage inequality in the United States is higher than in other devel-
oped countries, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution. They find that
individual characteristics do not fully explain this difference: the low degree of
unionization in the United States also contributes towards it as it means that col-
lective wage bargaining, which positively affects wages for the least paid workers,
is not as common as it is elsewhere. The decline of unionization in the United
States in the 1980s had an important effect on wage inequality for males, while
the wage gap for females was more affected by the minimum wage (Fortin and
Lemieux, 1997). Even and Macpherson (2003) study the effects that minimum
wages have on the wage distribution, finding that its effects depend on the pro-
portion of the population that earns it and the type of job that pays a minimum
wage: if it is an entry-level job, the effect will be on the short run, but it will be
more persistent if workers stay in the same job for longer.
This does not mean that technical change and institutions are mutually exclu-
sive causes of wage inequality. Weiss and Garloff (2011) reconcile both factors by
constructing a model in which technical change affect total productivity, but a
transfer mechanism from the most skilled workers to the unskilled workers raises
wages for all the workforce. The increase in general wages leads to an excess of
supply of unskilled workers creating unemployment, like in the case of continental
Europe. The absence of large scale welfare mechanisms means that the differen-
tiation of workers by their level of skills is manifested via wage inequality, as it
happened in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s.
Another key component in wage inequality is discrimination based on charac-
teristics that have no effect on labor performance. One of the first attempts to
measure discrimination were the studies by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973),
who independently developed a method to decompose wage difference into per-
sonal attributes and discrimination. Both found high levels of discrimination
against women and African Americans. Many authors have explored wage dif-
ferences by gender (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2007; Fang and Sakellariou, 2015;
Panizza and Qiang, 2005), usually finding lower wages for women compared to
men performing similar jobs. There are two analogous phenomena in female wage
distributions: the “glass ceiling,” which is found at the top of the distribution
and consists in highly skilled women earning less than comparable men, and the
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“sticky floor,” in the bottom of the distribution, consisting in lower wages for the
least skilled women in comparison to the least skilled men. Fang and Sakellariou
(2015) study wage distribution in the developing world and find that sticky floors
are more predominant in Asia and Africa, while glass ceilings are more common in
transition economies in Europe (just as discovered by Arulampalam et al., 2007).
There is evidence of sticky floors in Latin American countries with low income
per capita, like Bolivia and Peru, and glass ceilings in middle income countries,
like Uruguay and Brazil (Carrillo et al., 2014).
The difference in wages across sectors has also been the subject of thorough re-
search, especially the gap between public and private employers. In general, there
is a wage premium for workers in the public sector, and it has been found in both
developed countries (e.g. Mueller, 1998 for Canada) and developing economies
(e.g. Panizza and Qiang, 2005 and Mizala and Romaguera, 2011, both for Latin
America). However, workers at the top of the distribution often have wage penal-
ties by working in the public sector (Mueller, 1998; Mizala and Romaguera, 2011).
Since the understanding of wage determinants and its dynamics entails many
different aspects, the methodological approaches have been just as diverse. Previ-
ous studies have used several techniques that consider the wage distribution as a
whole in order to examine its evolution over time. For example, Buchinsky (1998)
uses quantile regression to estimate wage dynamics for females in the United
States. This procedure allows to estimate different rates of return in different
points of the wage distribution. DiNardo et al. (1996) develop a semiparametric
method to reproduce counterfactual wage distributions by re-weighting distribu-
tions based on the population characteristics at the beginning of the period. Melly
(2005) combines both methods through a two-step semiparametric approach that
allows covariates. First, conditional densities are obtained via quantile regression
and then they are integrated to build the unconditional distribution.
Literature on wage inequality and wage dynamics about labor markets from
developed countries is more extensive than that from developing economies, and
many of the theoretical results and methods are built from stylized facts from
such economies. However, labor markets in developing countries have important
differences in comparison to those in advanced economies. For instance, Freeman
and Oostendorp (2000) study the wages in 161 occupations in over 150 countries
between 1983 and 1998, finding that skill differentials are higher in developing
economies because of institutional factors and also because of the lower degrees
of educational attainment in such countries. Minimum wages and employment
protection laws reduce wage inequality in developing economies, even though such
policies do not yield significant gains in terms of efficiency (Betcherman, 2014).
Another important feature in developing economies is job informality. Yamada
(1996) points that in these economies, the informal sector provides a competitive
alternative to the formal economy for many workers; workers will transition from
the informal sector to other sectors only if they can find better opportunities
elsewhere.
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Despite the aforementioned differences, labor market in developing countries
have been affected by similar shocks to those experienced in developed economies,
like SBTC or institutional changes. In India, for example, the returns to higher
education increased in the 1990s, particularly benefiting workers who earned the
highest wages (Azam, 2012). The author notes that the heterogeneity of returns
to education led to an increase in wage inequality in India. An example of the role
of institutions in developing labor markets is the study by Bakis and Polat (2015)
of the wage changes in Turkey in the 2000s. In that country, wage inequality
declined mainly due to a reform in 2004 that increased real minimum wages.
Wage dynamics in Latin America are similar to other developing areas. During
the 1980s and 1990s, wage inequality in the region increased, not only because
of the technological changes of the time, that had similar effects in developed
economies, but also due to some policies implemented during that time frame,
like capital market opening, tax reforms or domestic financial sector reforms
(Behrman et al., 2000). In recent years, however, the trend has reversed and
some countries have experienced reductions in wage inequality (Ferna´ndez and
Messina, 2017). These authors found that wage inequality in Argentina, Brazil
and Chile declined in the late 1990s and 2000s. They attribute these decreases
to changes in the composition of labor markets and to reductions in education
and experience premiums. Nevertheless, discrimination is still an important phe-
nomenon in Latin America. Atal et al. (2009) analyze the gender and ethnic wage
gaps in 18 countries in the region and found that, in average, men are paid 10%
more than women and ethnic minorities earn about 13% less than non-minorities.
Also, the authors note that there exists great heterogeneity across countries in
both gender and ethnic gaps.
III. Background: Labor Markets in Bolivia and Colombia
Bolivia and Colombia have taken different economic policies in the last decade.
Under the presidency of Evo Morales, Bolivia’s economic policy has focused on
the improvement of the well-being of the population through redistribution and
equality, whereas Colombia has taken policies aiming more towards economic
growth and prosperity (Aristiza´bal-Ramı´rez et al., 2015). In spite of the different
approaches in economic policy, both countries have had high rates of economic
growth during the last ten years, boosted by the commodities boom during the
late 2000s and early 2010s. The average GDP growth rate in Bolivia between
2006 and 2015 was 5.0%, while Colombia’s average GDP growth rate for the
same period was 4.6% (World Bank, 2017).
A. Bolivia
Evo Morales was elected in 2005 and in 2006 became the first indigenous and
socialist president of Bolivia. During his presidency, Bolivia has distanced itself
from the influence of Western institutions and he has passed several economic
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reforms like the nationalization of important industrial sectors (e.g. hydrocar-
bons, mining), the creation of social welfare programs and the implementation
of antidiscrimination law towards indigenous populations. Furthermore, presi-
dent Morales increased the royalty taxes for hydrocarbons providing additional
revenue used to increase public spending (Hicks et al., 2015; Canavire-Bacarreza
and Rios-Avila, 2015).
Morales’ presidency has influenced the Bolivian labor market in several ways.
Real wages in Bolivia have grown considerably in the last ten years. In 2005,
the monthly minimum wage was 440 Bolivianos (US$ 55). By 2015, it had in-
creased fourfold, to 1,656 Bolivianos (US$ 238) (Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-
Avila, 2015). In addition, the unemployment rate has been lower than the Latin
American average for the period of study (INE, 2017; ILO, 2017) (see Figure 1).1
However, the job informality rate is over 50% (UDAPE, 2017), and is one of the
highest in the region (ILO, 2017).2
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Figure 1. : Labor Market Statistics for Bolivia. Sources: INE (2017); UDAPE (2017)
B. Colombia
The 2000s and 2010s in Colombia have been a period of steady economic growth
and improvement of life conditions. Presidents A´lvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and
1The Latin American average unemployment rate for the period 2006-2015 is 7.5% (ILO, 2017)
2In 2015, the average rate of informality in Latin America was 46.8% (ILO, 2016)
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Juan Manuel Santos (since 2010) have managed to significantly reduce the inten-
sity of the Colombian armed conflict, thus providing a sense of confidence in the
country’s economy. Their economic policies have been targeted to promote pri-
vate investment and free markets (Aristiza´bal-Ramı´rez et al., 2015). Indeed, the
National Development Plan 2010-2014 states that the main goal of the govern-
ment is achieving economic prosperity through improvements in national security,
employment and poverty alleviation (DNP, 2011). Some of the policies that have
been carried out in recent years to boost growth and create jobs include the im-
plementation of free trade agreements with Colombia’s main trading partners,3
the privatization of public companies and several reforms to reduce the cost of
labor for employers.
Between 2006 and 2015, the Colombian labor market showed several signs of
improvement, in line with the economic situation of this period. Labor partici-
pation has had a slight increase, while unemployment and job informality have
decreased steadily, although both rates are still above Latin American average (see
Figure 2). Real wages in Colombia, however, have not increased much during this
time frame. This slow growth in wages has been commonplace in Colombian his-
tory, as Urrutia and Ruiz (2010) found after analyzing the behavior of real wages
for 170 years. Also, Arango Thomas et al. (2011) discovered that real wages in
Colombia are to some extent flexible to changes in labor supply and demand,
depending on the economic activity. However, observed rigidities in some sectors
and regions may be caused by simultaneous supply and demand shocks. More
recently, Morales and Medina (2016) studied the effects on the labor market of
a tax reform in 2012 that eliminated 13.5 points of payroll taxes. Such measure
was effective in reducing unemployment, but had little effect on wages.
IV. Data
The data used in this paper came from household surveys conducted by the
national office of statistics in each country (Bolivia’s Instituto Nacional de Es-
tad´ıstica - INE and Colombia’s Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Es-
tad´ıstica - DANE). In the case of Bolivia, data encompasses nine years, from
2006, when president Evo Morales took office, to 2015.4 On the other hand,
data from Colombia is available from 2008 to 2015. Household surveys in both
countries gather information about sociodemographic characteristics such as gen-
der, age, marital status or education, and also contain information regarding the
occupation status and the labor conditions of each member of the household.
For this article, I include workers in urban areas in both countries whose ages
are between 15 and 65 years old. Following Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila
(2015), I exclude rural workers due to the volatility of rural labor markets. In
3Colombia has free trade agreements with the United States, Mexico, the European Union, South
Korea, Chile and the Andean Community of Nations (Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru), among others
4Data from 2010 is missing because the INE did not conduct the household survey during that year.
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Figure 2. : Labor Market Statistics for Colombia. Source: DANE (2017)
total, the dataset contains more than 54,000 observations for Bolivia and over 1.1
million observations for Colombia. In average, there are about 6,000 observations
per year for Bolivia, and about 140,000 observations per year for Colombia.
In both Bolivia and Colombia, household surveys inquire about the monthly
labor income. To make both measures comparable to each other, I define labor
income in the following way: For employed workers, the monthly labor income
consists of the net salary, after legal deductions. On the other hand, labor in-
come for self-employed workers is the available income for consumption in the
household, after discounting the costs related to their occupation.
To account for the differences in income related to differences in hours worked,
and to also account for the differences due to full or part time labor, I divide the
reported monthly income by the monthly hours worked, thus obtaining hourly
wages. Then, I adjust the computed hourly income for inflation using the average
annual Consumer Price Index for each country. After obtaining real hourly wages
for each country, they are converted to 2010 United States Dollars (USD) using
the official exchange rate in each country. Thus, the final wage variable is the
logarithm of the real hourly wage, expressed in 2010 USD.
Furthermore, I classify the labor force into three criteria in order to provide
further insights about the subsets of the population that have been the most af-
fected (or benefited) by the changes in the wage distribution: gender, educational
attainment and sector of the economy in which the person works. The categories
in both datasets are defined in the same way to avoid differences in the results
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caused by discrepancies in the classification of the workforce.
The education level in this analysis is divided in three levels: the first one,
labeled “Primary Education” includes all workers who have no formal education
or have only received elementary education. “Secondary Education” gathers those
workers that have an education level comparable to high school in the United
States (“Secundaria” in Bolivia and “Bachillerato” in Colombia). Finally, the
workers who have post-secundary education, either a university degree or technical
education, are included in the “Tertiary Education” level. Including education
allows to split the workforce by skills, since more education implies higher levels
of human capital.
To consider economic sector, I divide the sample into workers in the public
and private sectors. A worker belongs to the public sector if he/she works at a
public entity of any level (national, regional or local) or if the company where
he/she works is owned by the state. Then, I split the private sector into formal
and informal sector using the International Labor Organization definition,5 that
states that a worker is in the informal sector if he/she is self-employed, a domestic
employee, an unpaid employee at family organizations, or works at a firm with
five or less employees. If a worker does not fit into any of these criteria, he/she
is considered to be working in the formal sector. The distinction of sector is
particularly important for developing countries because of the high rates of job
informality (see Figures 1 and 2) and because of the differences in rules and
institutions between the formal and informal sectors.
Table 1 shows the composition of the labor market in Bolivia and Colombia
respectively. In relation to Colombia, Bolivia has higher participation of males
in the workforce and similar levels of education. The rates of informality in both
countries are still very high: About half of the workforce in both Bolivia and
Colombia work in the informal sector.
Table 1—: Discrete variable categories and relative frequencies. Values in parentheses are corrected for
sample weights
Variable Frequency
Name Categories Bolivia Colombia
Gender
Male 58.8% (59.1%) 52.4% (53.4%)
Female 41.2% (40.9%) 47.6% (46.6%)
Education
Primary Education 29.5% (31.2%) 36.7% (34.9%)
Secondary Education 39.1% (38.7%) 31.6% (30.4%)
Tertiary Education 31.4% (30.1%) 31.7% (34.8%)
Economic Sector
Public 16.5% (15.1%) 5.1% (4.4%)
Formal 28.5% (30.0%) 37.0% (42.2%)
Informal 55.0% (54.9%) 57.9% (53.4%)
Number of Observations 54,631 1,120,837
5See Hussmanns (2004) for a discussion about the definition of informal job and informal sector
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The main descriptive statistics for real hourly wages in each country are in Table
2. Figures 3 and 4 show the wage probability density function by year for Bolivia
and Colombia respectively. The graphs on the left of each figure are stacked using
the methodology proposed by Hyndman et al. (1996). The graphs on the right
show a two-dimensional plot of all the distributions. These figures suggest that
real wages in Bolivia have had a steady upward trend during the analyzed period,
whereas real wages in Colombia did not increase as much. Instead, the wage
distribution in Colombia has compressed around the median, suggesting higher
levels of wage concentration. This phenomenon is specially noticed in the last
two years of the studied period. In addition, I observe that during the period of
study, the mean hourly wage in Colombia was higher than in Bolivia. However,
the difference between hourly wages in both countries has narrowed in recent
years.
Table 2—: Descriptive Statistics, log Real Hourly Wage in 2010 USD. Numbers in parentheses are
corrected for sample weights
(a) Bolivia.
N 54,631
Mean 0.168 (0.120)
Median 0.191 (0.178)
Standard Deviation 0.864 (0.880)
Minimum -5.385
Maximum 5.509
(b) Colombia.
N 1,120,837
Mean 0.344 (0.452)
Median 0.325 (0.315)
Standard Deviation 0.858 (0.862)
Minimum -14.722
Maximum 7.337
It is worth noting that both countries have national minimum wages. However,
there are two reasons for which it does not constitute a lower bound for the wage
distributions. First, self-employed workers constitute about 40% of the labor force
in both countries (INE, 2017; DANE, 2017). Since these workers do not have an
employment contract that guarantees the enforcement of minimum wage laws, it
is possible for this type of workers to earn less than the minimum wage. Second,
the wage distributions used in this article are measured in hours whereas the
minimum wage in both countries is expressed in monthly terms for full-time jobs.
Legislation in both countries state that no worker can work more than 48 hours a
week. Thus, it would be possible to obtain a minimum hourly wage. Nevertheless,
data from both countries suggest that this measure is not always enforced. More
than 25% of the formal sector workers in the sample in both Bolivia and Colombia
work over 48 hours (INE, 2017; DANE, 2017). Therefore, even in companies that
comply with minimum wage laws, workers may earn an hourly wage below the
equivalent to the minimum hourly wage. Since a lower bound discontinuity point
is not present in the data, FPCA can be applied to each family of distributions.
In addition to the previously presented descriptive statistics, I calculate the
11
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Figure 3. : Wage densities by year for Bolivia. Densities were calculated using a second-order Gaussian
kernel. The bandwidths were chosen using Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb approximation.
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Figure 4. : Wage densities by year for Colombia. Densities were calculated using a second-order Gaussian
kernel. The bandwidths were chosen using Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb approximation.
90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 wage gaps across time to examine how has wage inequality
changed over time (see Figures 5 and 6). These gaps are calculated by dividing
the earnings of the highest percentile by the earnings of the lowest percentile.
Measuring these three ratios allows me to assess changes in overall inequality,
in the top and in the bottom of the distribution respectively. In both countries
wage inequality has decreased significantly. In Bolivia, the main changes in wage
inequality are seen in the top of the wage distribution, whereas the reduction in
12
wage inequality in Colombia is more evident at the lowest wages.
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Figure 5. : Wage gaps by year - Bolivia. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
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Figure 6. : Wage gaps by year - Colombia. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
Tables 3 and 4 compare the wage of some subsets of the population in Bolivia
and Colombia. In both countries, males earn more, and as expected, skilled
workers have a wage premium over their unskilled counterparts. Additionally,
public workers in both countries have higher wages.
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Table 3—: Mean log Real Hourly Wage (in 2010 USD) by some characteristics - Bolivia
Variable Mean Difference P-Value
Gender
Male Female
0.255 0.043 0.212 0.000
Education
Tertiary Education Secondary Education or less
0.585 -0.023 0.608 0.000
Sector
Public Formal Private
0.754 0.288 0.466 0.000
Formal Private Informal Private
0.288 -0.070 0.358 0.000
Table 4—: Mean log Real Hourly Wage (in 2010 USD) by some characteristics - Colombia
Variable Mean Difference P-Value
Gender
Male Female
0.430 0.250 0.180 0.000
Education
Tertiary Education Secondary Education or less
0.913 0.080 0.834 0.000
Sector
Public Formal Private
1.408 0.587 0.820 0.000
Formal Private Informal Private
0.587 0.095 0.492 0.000
V. Functional Principal Component Analysis
A. Overview
Functional Principal Component Analysis (hereafter FPCA) is the adaptation
of multivariate Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to functional data. Just
as PCA, FPCA is a technique of dimensionality reduction that decomposes data
into the most important modes of variation (components). However, as data is
functional (each observation is a function defined on a common bounded interval),
components are not random variables defined in Rn, where n is the number of
observations, but random functions defined in the L2 space of square-integrable
functions.
Kneip and Utikal (2001) propose the use of FPCA to characterize the evolution
of a family of probability density functions {ft}Tt=1 over time. Based on the
Karhunen-Loe`ve decomposition, they represent each density of {ft}Tt=1 as follows:
(1) ft = fµ +
L∑
j=1
θtjgj .
14
Equation (1) states that the FPCA decomposition consists in expressing each
density ft as the sum of the mean of the family of distributions fµ =
∑T
t=1 ft/T
and a time-specific deviation from the mean
∑L
j=1 θtjgj . These deviations will be
referred to as deformations, just as in Kneip and Utikal (2001).
In turn, each deformation has two terms: A time-invariant common component
(gj), which corresponds to the j-th eigenfunction from FPCA (Kneip and Utikal,
2001), describing the cross-sectional differences between the distribution in a given
year and the common mean distribution, and a time-varying strength coefficient
θtj , that captures the evolution of densities over time, allowing the identification
of the differences and similarities between the distributions (Huynh et al., 2016).
The number of components needed to fully characterize the family of probability
density functions is given by L, the number of nonzero eigenvalues of the empirical
covariance operator.
B. Estimation Strategy
As previously described, the FPCA decomposition requires the estimation of
the empirical covariance operator. As an alternative, Kneip and Utikal (2001)
propose the following procedure to find gj and θtj . They estimate the T × T
matrix M , whose elements are defined by
(2) Mts = 〈ft − fµ〉 〈fs − fµ〉 ∀t, s,
where the scalar product 〈ξ1, ξ2〉 is defined by 〈ξ1, ξ2〉 =
∫
ξ1(x)ξ2(x)dx.
The eigenvectors pr = (pr1, . . . , prT ) and corresponding nonzero eigenvalues
λ1 ≥ λ2 · · · ≥ λL of the matrix M are related to gj and θtj in equation (1) as
follows:
(3) θtr = λ
1/2
r ptr,
(4) gr = λ
−1/2
r
T∑
t=1
ptrft =
∑T
t=1 θtrft∑T
t=1 θ
2
tr
.
The estimation methodology presented in Kneip and Utikal (2001) applies to the
estimation of continuous univariate distributions. Huynh et al. (2011) extend that
method to allow the incorporation of categorical variables by using Li and Racine’s
(2003) technique to calculate kernel estimation of mixed continuous and discrete
variables. I use this extension of the methodology to perform the estimations in
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order to account for the heterogeneity of the labor force and assess the differences
in wage dynamics across groups.
Let X denote the continuous variable and let Xd = {xd1, xd2, xd3} be the set
of categorical variables xdk. The procedure presented by Huynh et al. (2011) to
estimate θtj and gj in (1) has three steps. First, each probability density function
at time t is estimated as follows:
(5) f̂t,h =
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
1
h
W
(
x−Xit
h
)
Lυ,xd,Xdi t
.
In equation (5), W (·) is a univariate kernel estimator for the continuous variable
and Lυ,xd,Xdit
=
∏r
s=1 l(x
ds , Xdsit , υ) is the product kernel estimator of the discrete
variables. The bandwidth used in the kernel estimation of the continuous variable
is h, whereas υ is the bandwidth vector used for the kernel estimation of the
discrete variables.
Using these estimations, the elements of M̂ , the estimator of M , are computed
using equation (2).
The eigenvectors pr = (pr1, . . . , prT ) and corresponding nonzero eigenvalues
λ1 ≥ λ2 · · · ≥ λT of the matrix M̂ are then calculated. θ̂tr and ĝr are estimated
analogously to (3) and (4), but using a different set of kernel estimators with
bandwidth b:
(6) θ̂tr = λ̂
1/2
r p̂tr,
(7) ĝr = λ̂
−1/2
r
T∑
t=1
p̂trf̂t,b =
∑T
t=1 θ̂trf̂t∑T
t=1 θ̂
2
tr
.
Huynh et al. (2011) prove that their method keeps the consistency of θtr and
the asymptotic normality of gr.
The bandwidth choice strategy is the one adopted by Huynh et al. (2016). First,
I use Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb approximation to calculate the bandwidth
for the wage distributions b˜ and indicator functions to compute bandwidths for the
discrete variables. These bandwidths are then rate-corrected by setting ĥ = b˜5/4
and b̂ = b˜ × T−1/5 respectively, as suggested by Kneip and Utikal (2001) and
Huynh et al. (2011). To check the robustness of the results to bandwidth selection,
I also compute cross-validated maximum likelihood bandwidths and recalculate
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the estimations using this new set of bandwidths.6
VI. Results
I present the results from the FPCA decomposition in four parts. First, the
dynamic scree plots are shown to select how many components are needed for
explaining a good proportion of the total density temporal variability. Second,
I use the dynamic strength components θ̂tr to analyze the evolution of the wage
distribution over time. Third, the common components ĝr are presented to iden-
tify the points in the distribution where the changes have occurred. Finally, I
present total deformations to show the overall movement of the wage distribution
and to explore how different groups of the labor force have contributed to total
variation.
A. Dynamic Scree Plot
The dynamic scree plots (Figure 7) gather the proportion of total change in
the distribution attributable to each component j by plotting the ratio of each
estimated eigenvalue λ̂j and the total sum of estimated eigenvalues
∑T
i=1 λ̂i. In
the analysis for Bolivia, the first two components explain an important proportion
of total variation (47.2% and 34.5% respectively). For Colombia, the first two
components contribute to 59.5% and 16.1% of total variation respectively. In
order to explain as much of the variation as possible, the first two components
will be used for each country.
B. Dynamic Score Components
The dynamic score components θ̂tr capture the evolution over time of the family
of wage distributions. The first two dynamic score components for Bolivia and
Colombia are plotted in Figure 8.
The dynamic score components for Bolivia change over time in opposite direc-
tions, except for two periods: both of them decrease in 2011 and increase in 2012.
The second dynamic score component, while decreasing after 2012, has values
closer to zero than first dynamic score component in the same time frame. Then,
the net effect is positive and the wage distribution moves toward higher values.
In the case of Colombia, θ̂t,1 shows an increasing trend across almost the whole
time frame, only starting to decrease after 2014, suggesting a slow but constant
growth in wages. On the other hand, θ̂t,2 has a downward trend until 2011, when
it begins to recover. The joint movement of both components suggests a sluggish
evolution of wages between 2008 and 2013, with moderate growth in 2014 and
2015.
6Appendix A presents the bandwidths used for the estimations. Results under cross-validated maxi-
mum likelihood bandwidths are shown in Appendix B.
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Figure 7. : Dynamic Scree Plot for Bolivia (left) and Colombia (right)
As dynamic score components measure changes over time for the wage distribu-
tion, I contrast them with some macroeconomic series. The correlation coefficients
of the first two dynamic score components with select macroeconomic variables
are presented in Table 5. These correlations are useful to understand how wages
respond to changes in the economic situation of the country.
In Bolivia, the first dynamic score component is correlated negatively with the
unemployment and informality rates. Furthermore, the correlation of the first dy-
namic strength component with GDP per capita growth is positive, in line with
the findings of several authors (e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999; Xu et al., 2015). The
correlation with the investment/GDP ratio and the first component is also posi-
tive. This points to a raise in wages due to increased labor demand. The second
dynamic strength component has negative correlation with occupation rates and
GDP per capita growth, while it is positively correlated to unemployment and
informality. These signs are consistent with an increase in wages due to reduced
labor supply. Nevertheless, considering that the first component explains a higher
share of total variation, the demand effect seems stronger.
In Colombia, there is strong positive correlation between the first common com-
ponent and occupation rates, coupled with strong negative correlation between
wages and unemployment. This points to the transmission of levels of employ-
ment to wages. The signs suggest that this change is related to increased labor
demand. Contributing to this hypothesis is the high positive correlations between
this component and investment/GDP ratio: as investment grows, labor demand
increases. This strong relation does not hold with GDP growth. The correlation
coefficient is positive but small. Robin (2011) finds that wages in the middle of
the distribution are less procyclical than those in the extremes. Since wage dis-
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Figure 8. : First two Dynamic Score Component θ̂tr evolution: θ̂t1 (top) θ̂t2 (bottom) for Bolivia (left)
and Colombia (right)
tribution in Colombia is very concentrated around the median, total correlation
should be smaller than it would be if the distribution had higher standard devi-
ation. This might also explain why the correlation of wages and GDP growth is
larger in Bolivia. Correlations of the second dynamic strength components with
the unemployment and informality rates are negative, as in the case of the first
component. Nevertheless, correlations with occupation rate and GDP growth are
negative. These facts reinforce the hypothesis that the changes in wages have
been due to shifts in labor demand, but also suggest that wages in Colombia are
not very sensitive to the economic cycle.
C. Common Components
Common components gˆr gather the cross-sectional differences between a distri-
bution for a given set of categories and the mean distribution. From Equation
(7), it should be evident that there are as many ĝr as possible combinations of
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Table 5—: Correlation coefficient of θ̂t,1 and θ̂t,2 and some macroeconomic variables. Source of macroe-
conomic series: DANE (2017), World Bank (2017), INE (2017)
(a) Bolivia
Variable Correlation with θ̂t,1 Correlation with θ̂t,2
Unemployment Rate -0.555 0.585
Occupation Rate -0.477 -0.214
Informality Rate -0.419 0.250
GDP per capita growth 0.389 -0.131
Inflation Rate -0.371 -0.158
Investment/GDP ratio 0.573 -0.758
(b) Colombia
Variable Correlation with θ̂t,1 Correlation with θ̂t,2
Unemployment Rate -0.972 -0.051
Occupation Rate 0.871 -0.451
Informality Rate -0.917 -0.297
GDP per capita growth 0.261 -0.615
Inflation Rate -0.319 0.657
Investment/GDP ratio 0.855 0.214
values for the categorical variables.7 In this case, there are 2 · 3 · 3 = 18 different
combinations. To summarize the behavior of all the ĝr, they are summed and
gathered in the Total Common Components (TCC) g˜r:
g˜r =
∑
xdi∈Xd
ĝr.
The first two TCC for Bolivia and Colombia are displayed in Figure 9. In the
case of Bolivia, both common components shows the change from low levels of
wage toward higher levels, as seen in the evolution of the wage distribution across
time (Figure 3). On the other hand, the first common component for Colombia
shows little deviation in the extreme values and a large movement around the
median of the distribution, consistent with the concentration of wages around the
median. The second common component for Colombia shows volatility in the
center of the distribution while also presenting little difference in the extremes of
the distribution.
7Since calculating ĝr entails the estimation of f̂t,b, the bandwidths vector change as the values of the
categorical values change, leading to different kernel estimations and different common components.
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Figure 9. : Bolivia - First two Total Common Components g˜r =
∑
xdi ∈Xd
ĝr r = 1, 2.
D. Dynamic Deformations
The dynamic deformation θ̂trĝr shows the overall movement of the density
across time. It combines the differences across time due to different dynamic
score components θ̂tr and the cross-sectional differences captured by the common
components ĝr.
To provide a general view of the changes, I employ TCC (g˜r). Total deformation
in period t for component r is equal to:
g˜rθ̂tr =
∑
xdi∈Xd
ĝrθ̂tr.
TCC can be decomposed to reflect the total component for a specific value k of
any discrete variable xdj . By computing total components for specific values, it
is possible to analyze the wage dynamics for specific subsets of the population.
From the total components for a specific category, it is possible to obtain the total
deformation for such value:
(8) g˜r(·, xdj = k)θ̂tr =
∑
xdi , x
d
j=k
ĝr(·, xdj = k)θ̂tr.
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Note that the θ̂tr used in computing the conditional total deformation in (8)
are the same as those used in the unconditional total deformation. Hence, the
relationship between conditional and unconditional total deformation depends
only on g˜r. Using this result, Huynh et al. (2016) calculate the share of variation
accounted for by each value of the discrete variable by regressing g˜r(·, xdj = k) on
g˜r.
In the remainder of this section, only the first (and largest) component de-
formation will be analyzed for brevity. Moreover, even though it is possible to
obtain deformations for all periods, this analysis will focus on the deformations
on the first and the last periods in order to obtain the combined deformation
over the period of interest. The proportion of change according to each value of
the discrete variables included in the estimation for the first components in each
country are presented in Table 6.
Table 6—: Share of variation accounted for by each category of the discrete variables
Categories
Share of variation
Bolivia - θ̂,1ĝ1 Colombia - θ̂,1ĝ1
Male Female Total Male Female Total
67.5% 32.5% 100.0% 52.7% 47.3% 100.0%
Education
Primary Education 9.0% 13.9% 22.9% 20.1% 13.8% 33.9%
Secondary Education 47.0% 11.2% 58.2% 21.5% 18.1% 39.6%
Tertiary Education 11.5% 7.4% 18.9% 11.1% 15.3% 26.5%
Sector
Public 3.3% 1.9% 5.2% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1%
Formal 20.2% 9.5% 29.8% 33.0% 31.5% 64.4%
Informal 44.0% 21.0% 65.0% 19.7% 15.9% 35.7%
Figure 10 shows the total deformation for the first component (g˜1θ̂t;1) for both
countries. In Bolivia, the magnitude of the changes in density is not very large,
but it occurs at a large interval of values, which means that the raise in wages in
Bolivia has been rather uniform. The behavior of the wage deformation is similar
in either side of the median, further supporting the idea of an uniform growth in
wages. The deformation for 2006 has slightly larger absolute values than the one
for 2015, leading to a moderate increase in wage concentration.
In the case of Colombia, total deformation for the first component suggests
that both tails of the distribution have stayed stable through time. Changes to
the left of the median have been less drastic but encompass a wider interval of
values. The largest two peaks of variation are around the median, suggesting
an important increase in wage concentration. Moving to the right tail of the
distribution, variation is higher than that of the left tail but occurs in a smaller
interval, thus fading away faster. Summarizing, the movement of the whole wage
distribution in Colombia between 2008 and 2015 can be described as a slight
growth in wages, paired to a considerable increase in wage concentration around
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the median wage.
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Figure 10. : Total deformation for the first component - Bolivia (top) and Colombia (bottom). The
dotted line represents the median wage, corrected for sample weights
In the following subsections, I analyze how total change is distributed between
different groups of the workforce by comparing the total deformation for a specific
category to the total deformation of the wage distribution.
Differences by gender. — The differences of wage evolution by gender in
Bolivia and Colombia are depicted in Figure 11 The changes in wages in Bolivia
have been mainly due to changes in male wages, who have benefited from both
a decrease in the proportion of workers who earn low wages and an increase in
the proportion of workers earning higher wages. Female wages have had a similar
behavior, but its magnitude has been smaller. Women only have bigger shares of
variation at both extremes of the distribution
On the other hand, the variation of wages in Colombia has been distributed
more equally, although males had a slightly larger share of total variation. Notice
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however that females who earn low salaries had smaller variation in wages than
low-paid males. As wages increase, so does the proportion of change attributable
to variations in female wages.
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Figure 11. : Total deformation by gender: male (top) and female (bottom) in Bolivia (left) and Colombia
(right). Percentages show the share of total variation attributed to each group. The darker shaded area
represents total deformation in the first year studied (2006 for Bolivia and 2008 for Colombia), and the
lighter shaded area represents total deformation in 2015. The dotted line represents the median wage,
corrected for sample weights
In Colombia, female wages in the bottom of the distribution did not change as
much as the male wages. Given that on average women earn less, this reduced
share could point to a sticky floor phenomenon. Such phenomenon is not as
evident in Bolivia, where women who earned the lowest wages had more variation
than men.
Differences by education. — The education level of the workforce in Bolivia
and Colombia is not very dissimilar, but the shares of wage variation received
by each type of workers have noticeable differences. While in both countries, the
most educated workers receive the smallest share of the change in wages, Colom-
bian workers with tertiary education are accountable for a larger proportion of
total change than their Bolivian counterparts, as it can be seen in Figure 12.
Indeed, over half of the total variation in wages in Bolivia has been received by
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workers with secondary education. Furthermore, workers with secondary educa-
tion contribute more to total variation than more educated workers in all levels of
remuneration, in contrast to Colombia, where despite their smaller contribution
to total wage variation, the most skilled workers explain most of the variation at
the highest levels of remuneration. This indicates that in Bolivia, more education
does not translate into higher variation in wages.
Another difference between the wage dynamics in both countries is that Colom-
bian females with higher education explain a larger proportion of total wage
variation than similarly educated males, while in Bolivia males receive higher
percentages of the total wage change. This means that the Colombian gender
wage gap is reduced as education levels increase. In Bolivia, the opposite is true:
female workers with primary education are accountable to higher shares of total
wage variation. For Bolivian women, increasing their education level does not
imply improving their participation in total wage change.
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Figure 12. : Total deformation by education level: primary education (top), secondary education (middle)
and tertiary education (bottom) in Bolivia (left) and Colombia (right). Percentages show the share of
total variation attributed to each group. The darker shaded area represents total deformation in the
first year studied (2006 for Bolivia and 2008 for Colombia), and the lighter shaded area represents total
deformation in 2015. The dotted line represents the median wage, corrected for sample weightsted line
represents the median wage, corrected for sample weights
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Differences by sector. — In Figure 13, total wage deformation for both coun-
tries is split into economic sector. In the case of Bolivia, two facts stand out:
First, even though the Bolivian public sector employ more than 15% of the work-
force, it does not have a large contribution to total wage variation. Second, more
than half of total wage change in Bolivia is accountable to the informal sector,
implying that workers in the formal sector have not benefited as much from the
general wage increase as informal workers have. This might be a hindrance to-
wards job formalization, since workers can have larger increases in wages if they
remain in the informal sector.
The case of Colombia is the opposite of Bolivia, as the formal sector is the main
contributor to wage variation. It is worth noting that like Bolivia, Colombia does
have high levels of job informality. Another remarkable result from Colombia is
that real wages in the public sector have remained stable between 2008 and 2015.
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Figure 13. : Total deformation by sector of the economy: public sector (top), formal sector (middle)
and informal sector (bottom) in Bolivia (left) and Colombia (right). Percentages show the share of
total variation attributed to each group. The darker shaded area represents total deformation in the
first year studied (2006 for Bolivia and 2008 for Colombia), and the lighter shaded area represents total
deformation in 2015. The dotted line represents the median wage, corrected for sample weights
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VII. Conclusions
Throughout this article, I explore the differences in wage evolution between Bo-
livia and Colombia, two developing countries that have adopted different economic
policies. To do so, I employ a decomposition method based on Functional Princi-
pal Component Analysis (FPCA), first developed by Kneip and Utikal (2001) and
Huynh et al. (2011) to analyze the behavior of the whole wage distribution. This
methodology has several features that makes it suitable for this kind of analysis,
such as the decomposition into components that contribute in different ways to
the dynamics and the capability to characterize the wage evolution for specific
groups of the population. Another advantage of FPCA, pointed by Huynh et al.
(2016), is the ease of graphical representation of the changes in the distributions,
thus facilitating the interpretation of the underlying dynamics.
To assess the differences in wage dynamics, I use data from urban household
surveys in both countries. The period of study starts in 2006, when Bolivia shifted
towards socialist policies under the presidency of Evo Morales, and goes to 2015.
In the same period, Colombia was going through a process of improvement in
national security and adoption of free-market policies. Due to data availability,
data from Colombia encompasses eight years, from 2008 to 2015. This time frame
was a period of accelerated economic growth in both Bolivia and Colombia, but
the wage dynamics in both countries had important differences.
In Bolivia, there has been a steady growth in wages between 2006 and 2015, that
has been roughly uniform across the whole wage distribution. Wage concentration
has also had a slight increase over the studied time frame. On the other hand,
while wages in Colombia have had a slow increase, the main phenomenon that
I found in Colombia is an important growth in wage concentration around the
median. These patterns are consistent with previous findings for both countries
(Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila, 2015 for Bolivia; Morales and Medina, 2016
for Colombia; and Aristiza´bal-Ramı´rez et al., 2015 for both). The behavior in
both countries is linked to an increase in labor demand, that is more evident in
the Colombian case.
However, the differences go beyond this general behavior. There are also dis-
parities in terms of the groups that have benefited the most from these changes
in wages. For instance, wage variation in Colombia has been distributed more
equally across genders, while changes in wages for Bolivian males are significantly
larger than the variation received by women. Interestingly, in both extremes of
the wage distribution in Bolivia, females accounted for more variation than men,
in contrast to Colombia, where the differences in share of variation were larger
in the lowest levels of remuneration, suggesting a sticky floor phenomenon for
women in Colombia, as it was found in Badel and Pen˜a (2010).
Both Bolivia and Colombia still have large proportions of workers who have low
levels of education. Nevertheless, returns to education in terms of wage variability
are not homogeneous. Bolivian workers with secondary education have benefited
more from the increase in wages than those with higher education, regardless of
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the wage level. Then, the most skilled workers in Bolivia have not had a premium
in wage variation in comparison to less educated workers. Colombian workers with
higher education have also had smaller shares of variation than the less educated
workers, but their returns differ from their Bolivian counterparts in three ways:
First, they received a larger share of the change than comparable Bolivian workers.
Second, Colombian workers with higher education received most of the change
in wages for the highest levels of remuneration, implying that they do have an
advantage in wage variability after certain wage threshold. Finally, female workers
with tertiary education were accountable for a larger proportion of the changes in
wages than similarly educated males, suggesting that, unlike Bolivia, the gender
wage gap in Colombia is reduced for the most skilled female workers.
The analysis by economic sector yields other remarkable results. The informal
sector in Bolivia was the most benefited from the increase in wages in the country
during the last ten years. This implies that workers in the informal sector may
not have an incentive to transition to the formal sector, as they can expect more
changes in their remuneration by staying in the informality. Wage variation in
Colombia, on the other hand, can be mostly attributed to changes in wages in
the formal sector, which has benefited from laws reducing the cost of labor, like
the 2012 tax reform.
The differences in wage behavior in both countries are compatible to their eco-
nomic policies. The Bolivian policies, focused more on redistribution and equality
have yielded higher wages for practically all workers, particularly benefiting the
most unskilled workers, whereas the free-market principles that Colombia has fol-
lowed led to higher concentration of wages around the median wage, implying a
process of convergence towards equilibrium wages.
Both countries face important issues to further improve labor remuneration.
The increase of wages in Bolivia did not provide an incentive to achieve higher
levels of education and to create formal jobs. This hinders the accumulation of
human capital and the growth in productivity. On the other hand, while the
concentration of wages in Colombia suggest a decrease in wage inequality, it can
also imply that workers remuneration in real terms is stagnant. In such case,
increases in productivity or in human capital are not rewarded. In addition, both
countries have common challenges like improving the educational attainment of
the workforce and reducing the rates of informality.
Although Bolivia and Colombia have common characteristics like similar labor
market composition or rapidly growing economies, wages in both countries have
changed in distinct ways. This comparison of wage dynamics under different eco-
nomic setups highlights the influence of economic policies on labor remuneration.
There is no labor policy that is guaranteed to improve the working conditions
of the population under any scenario; the particularities of each country should
be taken into consideration in order to decide the best course of action. Further
research can shed more light on the experience of other countries and provide
useful evidence to policymakers in developing countries.
28
References
Arango Thomas, L. E., Obando, N., and Posada Posada, C. E. (2011). Los salarios
reales a lo largo del ciclo econo´mico en colombia. (Borradores de Economı´a No.
666). Bogota´: Banco de la Repu´blica de Colombia.
Aristiza´bal-Ramı´rez, M., Canavire-Bacarreza, G., and Jetter, M. (2015). The
Different Sources of Income Inequality in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador.
Retrieved on May 5, 2017 from http://conference.iza.org/conference_
files/worldb2015/jetter_m8715.pdf.
Arulampalam, W., Booth, A. L., and Bryan, M. L. (2007). Is There a Glass Ceiling
over Europe? Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wages Distribution.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60(2):163–186.
Atal, J. P., N˜opo, H., and Winder, N. (2009). New Century, Old Disparities.
Gender and Ethnic Wage Gaps in Latin America. (IDB Working Paper Series
No. IDB-WP-109). Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. (2006). The Polarization of the U.
S. Labor Market. (Working Paper 11986). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER).
Azam, M. (2012). Changes in Wage Structure in Urban India, 1983-2004: A
Quantile Regression Decomposition. World Development, 40(6):1135–1150.
Badel, A. and Pen˜a, X. (2010). Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap with
Sample Selection Adjustment: Evidence from Colombia. Revista de Ana´lisis
Econo´mico, 25(2):169–191.
Bakis, O. and Polat, S. (2015). Wage inequality in Turkey 2002 - 10. Economics
of Transition, 23(1):169–212.
Barro, R. and Lee, J.-W. (2013). A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in
the World, 1950 - 2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104:184–198.
Behrman, J. R. (1999). Labor Markets in Developing Countries. In Ashenfelter,
O. and Card, D., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3B, chapter 43,
pages 2859–2939. Elsevier.
Behrman, J. R., Birdsall, N., and Sze´kely, M. (2000). Economic Reform and
Wage Differentials in Latin America. (Working Paper 435). Washington, DC:
Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).
Betcherman, G. (2014). Labor Market Regulations: What do we know about
their Impacts in Developing Countries. The World Bank Research Observer,
30:124–153.
29
Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M. (1996). International Differences in Male Wage
Inequality:Institutions versus Market Forces. Journal of Political Economy,
104(4):791–837.
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Esti-
mates. The Journal of Human Resources, 8(4):436–455.
Buchinsky, M. (1998). The Dynamics of Changes in the Female Wage Distribution
in the USA: A Quantile Regression Approach. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
13(1):1–30.
Canavire-Bacarreza, G. and Rios-Avila, F. (2015). On the Determinants of
Changes in Wage Inequality in Bolivia. (Working Paper 835). Annandale-
on-Hudson: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. Forthcoming in Journal
of Human Development and Capabilities.
Carrillo, P. E., Gandelman, N., and Robano, V. (2014). Sticky Floors and Glass
Ceilings in Latin America. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 12(3):339–361.
Chu, B. M., Huynh, K. P., Jacho-Cha´vez, D. T., and Kryvstov, O. (2016). On the
Evolution of the United Kingdom Price Distributions. Retrieved on January 16,
2017 from http://pages.iu.edu/~kphuynh/rsch/fpca_complex_v11.pdf.
DANE - Colombia’s National Administrative Department of Statistics (2017). Es-
tad´ısticas por tema: Mercado laboral. Data retrieved from http://www.dane.
gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral on February
2, 2017.
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M., and Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor Market Institu-
tions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.
Econometrica, 64(5):1001–1044.
DNP - Colombia’s Departamento Nacional de Planeacio´n (2011). Plan Nacional
de Desarrollo 2010-2014 “Prosperidad para Todos” - Resumen Ejecutivo -. Bo-
gota´: Departamento Nacional de Planeacio´n.
ECLAC - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(2016). Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean. San-
tiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Web version available at http://www.cepal.org/en/publications/
40972-anuario-estadistico-america-latina-caribe-2016-statistical-yearbook-latin-america.
Even, W. E. and Macpherson, D. A. (2003). The Wage and Employment Dynam-
ics of Minimum Wage Workers. Southern Economic Journal, 69(3):676–690.
Fang, Z. and Sakellariou, C. (2015). Glass Ceilings versus Sticky Floors: Evidence
from Southeast Asia and an International Update. Asian Economic Journal,
29(3):215–242.
30
Ferna´ndez, M. and Messina, J. (2017). Skill Premium, Labor Supply and Changes
in the Structure of Wages in Latin America. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10718.
Fortin, N. M. and Lemieux, T. (1997). Institutional Changes and Rising Wage In-
equality: Is there a Linkage? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2):75–
96.
Freeman, R. B. and Oostendorp, R. (2000). Wages Around the World: Pay
Across Occupations and Countries. (Working Paper 8058). Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Hicks, D. L., Maldonado, B., Piper, B., and Goytia R´ıos, A. (2015). Identity,
Patronage, and Redistribution: The Economic Impact of Evo Morales. Re-
trieved on May 6, 2017 from http://lacer.lacea.org/bitstream/handle/
123456789/53075/lacea2015_identity_patronage_redistribution.pdf?
sequence=1.
Hussmanns, R. (2004). Statistical definition of informal employment: Guidelines
endorsed by the Seventeenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians
(2003). 7th Meeting of the Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics (Delhi
Group) New Delhi, 2-4 February 2004.
Huynh, K. P. and Jacho-Cha´vez, D. T. (2010). Firm Size Distributions through
the Lens of Functional Principal Component Analysis. Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 125:1211–1214.
Huynh, K. P., Jacho-Cha´vez, D. T., Kryvtsov, O., Shepotylo, O., and Vakhitov,
V. (2016). The evolution of firm-level distributions for Ukranian manufacturing
firms. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44:148–162.
Huynh, K. P., Jacho-Cha´vez, D. T., Petrunia, R. J., and Voia, M. (2011). Func-
tional Principal Component Analysis of Density Families With Categorical and
Continuous Data on Canadian Entrant Manufacturing Firms. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 106(495):858–878.
Huynh, K. P., Jacho-Cha´vez, D. T., Petrunia, R. J., and Voia, M. (2015). A
nonparametric analysis of firm size, leverage and labour productivity dynamics.
Empirical Economics, 48:337–360.
Hyndman, R. J., Bashtannyk, D. M., and Grunwald, G. K. (1996). Estimating
and Visualizing Conditional Densities. Journal of Computational and Graphical
Statistics, 5(4):315–336.
ILO - International Labour Organization (2016). 2016 Labour Overview:
Latin American and the Caribbean. Lima: ILO/Regional Office
for Latin America and the Caribbean. Web version available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/
documents/publication/wcms_545825.pdf.
31
ILO - International Labour Organization (2017). ILOSTAT - ILO database
for labour economics. Data retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/ilostat on
February 3, 2017.
INE - Bolivia’s National Institute of Statistics (2017). Estad´ısticas del mer-
cado laboral. Data retrieved from http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/
2016-08-10-15-00-54/introduccion-2 on May 6, 2017.
Juhn, C., Murphy, K. M., and Pierce, B. (1993). Wage Inequality and the Rise
in Returns to Skill. The Journal of Political Economy, 101(3):410–442.
King, R. G. and Rebelo, S. T. (1999). Resuscitating Real Business Cycles. In Tay-
lor, J. B. and Woodford, M., editors, Handbook of Macroeconomics, volume 1B,
chapter 14, pages 927–1007. Elsevier.
Kneip, A. and Utikal, K. J. (2001). Inference for Density Families Using Func-
tional Principal Component Analysis. Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation, 96(454):519–532.
Li, Q. and Racine, J. (2003). Nonparamatric estimation of distributions with
categorical and continuous data. Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 86:266–292.
Melly, B. (2005). Decomposition of differences in distribution using quantile
regression. Labour Economics, 12:577–590.
Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (2011). Public-private wage gap in Latin America
(1992-2007):A matching approach. Labour Economics, 18:S115–S131.
Morales, L. F. and Medina, C. (2016). Assessing the Effect of Payroll Taxes on
Formal Employment: The Case of the 2012 Tax Reform in Colombia. (Bor-
radores de Economı´a No. 971). Bogota´: Banco de la Repu´blica de Colombia.
Mueller, R. E. (1998). Public-private sector wage differentials in Canada: evidence
from quantile regressions. Economics Letters, 60:229–235.
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets.
International Economic Review, 14(3):693–709.
Panizza, U. and Qiang, C. Z.-W. (2005). Public-private wage differential and
gender gap in Latin America: Spoiled bureaucrats and exploited women? The
Journal of Socio-Economics, 34:810–833.
Robin, J.-M. (2011). On the Dynamics of Unemployment and Wage Distributions.
Econometrica, 79(5):1327–1355.
Silverman, B. W. (1986). Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis.
London: Chapman & Hall/CRC press.
32
UDAPE - Bolivia’s Unidad de Ana´lisis de Pol´ıticas Sociales y Econo´micas
(2017). Dossier de estad´ısticas sociales y econo´micas. Data re-
trieved from http://www.udape.gob.bo/index.php?option=com_wrapper&
view=wrapper&Itemid=38 on May 6, 2017.
Urrutia, M. and Ruiz, M. (2010). Ciento Setenta An˜os de Salarios Reales en
Colombia. Ensayos sobre Pol´ıtica Econo´mica, 28(63):154–189.
Weiss, M. and Garloff, A. (2011). Skill-biased technological change and endoge-
nous benefits: the dynamics of unemployment and wage inequality. Applied
Economics, 43(7):811–821.
The World Bank (2017). World development indicators. Data retrieved
from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=
world-development-indicators on February 17, 2017.
Xu, S., Huo, L., and Shang, W. (2015). The impact of wage distributions on
economic growth based on multi-agent simulation. Procedia Comuter Science,
55:809–817.
Yamada, G. (1996). Urban Informal Employment and Self-Employment in De-
veloping Countries:Theory and Evidence. Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 44(2):289–314.
33
*Appendix A: Bandwidth selection
Table A1—: Bandwidths used in the estimations for Bolivia. ln(w): logarithm of real hourly wage, in
2010 USD; Educ: Educational attainment; Sec: Economic Sector
Year
Bandwidth
Rule-of-thumb approximation Maximum Likelihood Cross-Validation
ln(w) Gender Educ Sec ln(w) Gender Educ Sec
2006 0.1884 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3208 0.0447 0.0039 0.0115
2007 0.1774 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2775 0.0463 0.0171 0.0000
2008 0.1786 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2493 0.0505 0.0290 0.0121
2009 0.1694 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2836 0.0341 0.0106 0.0110
2011 0.1304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2220 0.0225 0.0181 0.0079
2012 0.1352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2080 0.0428 0.0074 0.0138
2013 0.1276 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2333 0.0095 0.0097 0.0054
2014 0.1343 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2129 0.0278 0.0254 0.0067
2015 0.1107 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1908 0.0306 0.0122 0.0082
Table A2—: Bandwidths used in the estimations for Colombia. ln(w): logarithm of real hourly wage, in
2010 USD; Educ: Educational attainment; Sec: Economic Sector
Year
Bandwidth
Rule-of-thumb approximation
ln(w) Gender Educ Sec
2008 0.0611 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2009 0.0607 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2010 0.0624 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2011 0.0586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2012 0.0570 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2013 0.0596 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2014 0.0510 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2015 0.0504 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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*Appendix B: Results under alternative bandwidth choice
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Figure B1. : Dynamic Scree Plot
Table B1—: Bolivia - Correlation coefficient of θ̂t,1 and θ̂t,2 and some macroeconomic variables.
Variable Correlation with θ̂t,1 Correlation with θ̂t,2
Unemployment Rate -0.526 0.606
Occupation Rate -0.489 -0.194
Informality Rate -0.411 0.263
GDP per capita growth 0.382 -0.154
Inflation Rate -0.384 -0.151
Investment/GDP ratio 0.536 -0.788
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Figure B2. : First two dynamic strength components θ̂t;r; r = 1, 2 evolution - Bolivia
Table B2—: Share of variation accounted for by each category of the discrete variables
Categories
Share of variation
Male Female Total
66.1% 33.9% 100.0%
Education
Primary Education 7.6% 13.5% 21.1%
Secondary Education 46.6% 12.6% 59.2%
Tertiary Education 11.9% 7.8% 19.7%
Sector
Public 3.5% 2.1% 5.6%
Formal 19.7% 10.0% 29.6%
Informal 42.9% 21.9% 64.8%
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Figure B3. : Bolivia - First two Total Common Components
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Figure B4. : Bolivia - Total deformation for the first component
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Figure B5. : Bolivia - Deformation by categories: gender (left), education level (middle) and economic
sector (right)
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